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Article 6

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: AN ARGUMENT FOR ASSERTING STATE CONTROL

I. Introduction
Since the turn of the century, the evils and limits of state licensing laws
have been subjected to examination by writers,' courts2 and politicians.' To our
present day, a steady stream of articles has continued to raise these same issues."
All of this scrutiny has not been in vain, for several states have revised their
different professional and occupational statutes.' The overwhelming majority of
states, however, are still either avoiding reform or are taking only meager steps
toward renovating their statutes in areas both substantive and procedural, despite
the fact that their legislatures are being overrun by requests from private interests
which beg for the licensing of their occupations.' The pressure for expansion of
licensed vocations cannot be denied; it is an open-ended phenomenon that
shows no sign of reaching a climax.
Although the topic of state licensing has received voluminous exposure, city
occupational licensing remains a part of the law that has been hurriedly bypassed. A closer look at this level of licensing throughout the country is absolutely
necessary in order for any meaningful advance to be made in the improvement
1 See, e.g., Fox, May Any Discretion be Exercised in the Issuance of Municipal Licenses?
66 CENT. L.J. 314 (1908).
2 For examples of the judicial attitude toward licensing laws in the early 1900's see
Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 62 N.E. 215 (1901) (horseshoers); Noel v. People, 187 Il.
587, 58 N.E. 616 (1900) (pharmacy); People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143, 90 N.E. 451 (1910)
(undertakers); State v. Walker, 48 Wash. 8, 92 P. 775 (1907) '(barbers); State ex rel. Richey
v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 84 P. 851 (1906) (plumbers). During that same era, the United States
Supreme Court recognized certain principles concerning state regulation of occupations. Dicta
from the now "dated" case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is informative in
this regard.
It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this
character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose
of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.
Id at 64.
For the most part, however, the Supreme Court has refrained from entering the field of state
licensing. As it had stated five years earlier in Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900),
Regulations respecting the pursuit of a lawful trade or business are of very
frequent occurrence in the various cities of the country, and what such regulations
shall be and to what particular trade, business or occupation they shall apply, are
questions for the State to determine, . . . and unless the regulations are so utterly
unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the property and
personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, and in a manner wholly arbitrary,
interfered with or destroyed without due process of law, they do not extend beyond
the power of the State to pass, and they form no subject for Federal interference.
Id. at 188.
3 See, e.g., Mount, Against Proposed Pharmacy Law, 1900 IND. Docur. J. 18, Vol. II
(1901).
4 For a comprehensive bibliography which includes most aspects of state licensing, see
COUNCIL OF STATE

GOVERNMENTS,

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN

T5IE STATES

104-06 (1952). An almost identical list appears in Barnett, Public Licenses and Private Rights,
33 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1953). Articles of particular value since the early 1950's are cited
throughout this Note.
5

See, e.g.,

CONN. GEN.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 20-330 to -341

(Supp.

1968)

(electricians,

plumbers, steamfitters and elevator repairmen); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86 (101-19) (Supp.
1968) (residential building contractors); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.18.010 -.350 (Supp. 1967)
(construction contractors).
6

Opperman, Needed: Standards for Occupational Licensing, PERSONNEL AND GUIDANCE

808 (April 1967). This article by Indiana State Senator Opperman lists seven occupational groups which proposed the enactment of state licensing laws for their occupations to
the Indiana State Legislature in 1965. According to Senator Opperman, "None of these
groups was successful, although failure resulted more from the legislature's reluctance to increase state administrative costs than because of opposition to the proposed licensing
measures." Id. at 808. See also Doyle, The Fence-Me-in Laws, 205 HARPER S, Aug. 1952, at
89, for another legislator's view of state licensing in the previous decade.
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of state licensing functions and procedures. One area of licensing in which cities
are very interested is that of the building trades. This seems to stem from the
fact that such licensing helps the city governments to effectively police their
building codes. Since the cities have no power beyond that given to them by
the state,7 problems arise when the licensing of one or two of these building trade
occupations is haphazardly pre-empted by the state. It is necessary, therefore,
that the whole purpose behind the statutory inclusion and exclusion of particular
trades be examined, and, after nearly seventy years, it is time for those who
assail the entire topic of state licensing by commenting solely on its arbitrariness
to propose definite solutions. As things presently stand, we have not traveled far
from the observation made by Professor Jaffe in 1953 that "[t]he matter of
standards in statutes and ordinances dealing with licensing of the common occupations has been in great confusion."' This Note will speak to the background
of both city and state licensing laws, to the problems which these two governmental entities create by working irrationally alone in the area, and, with a city
licensing survey as a guide,' to definite proposals that are designed to remedy
some of the current ills and abuses.
II. State Licensing -

A Brief Survey

It has been fifteen years since the Council of State Governments proposed
its "Act to Create a Department of Occupational Licensing"'0 to "those states
which contemplate reorganization of occupational licensing administration.""
What effect, if any, that proposal has had on the state legislatures is hard to
determine; it is, however, worthy of note that since that time several states have
adopted new licensing administration laws.' 2
Early in our history it was recognized that the state had power under the
United States Constitution to regulate and license local matters except in those
areas where such power was expressly granted by Congress to the federal government.
Accordingly, the states effectuate their licensing regulations through
their police power, limited, as their courts have seen fit, to the recognized categories of "health," "safety," and "general welfare."' 4 When requirements have
been applied to specific professions and occupations, there has often arisen a
tension between the licensing restriction and what has been termed "the right
7

See Kneier, The Licensing Power of Local Governments in Illinois, 1957 ILL. L.F. 1,2.

8

L. JAFFE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

52 (1953).

9 The Lawyer has conducted, by questionnaire, a survey of city licensing of building
trade occupations in selected cities throughout the United States. Since there has been no
comparative study made of this type of licensing in American municipalities, the effort was
undertaken to reveal the presence or lack of uniformity in licensing power and methods, and to
pinpoint existing common problems so that more practical solutions might be suggested. The
results are discussed in the text and footnotes to follow, and a chart of the cities surveyed and
their responses appears as Appendix A infra.
10

COUNCIL OF

STATE

GOVERNMENTS,

SUGGESTED

STATE

LEGISLATION

FOR

1953 65

(1953).
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-330 to -341 (Supp. 1968); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18.86(101-19) (Supp. 1968); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.18.10 -.
350 (Supp. 1967).
13 See, 'e.g., Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
14 See Note, Power of State to Restrict One's Right to Engage in Lawful Occupation, 25
VA. L. tEv. 219, 222 (1939).
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to work for a living in the common occupations of the community."'"
With possible exceptions of local peculiarity," the states did not begin by
licensing what are termed common occupations,' 7 but rather by licensing the
traditional professions of medicine and law.'" As the states subsequently began
to license some of the more common vocations such as plumbers, barbers and
real estate salesmen, their courts began to play a greater role in making certain
that the occupations regulated fit properly within the police power criteria set

forth in their state constitutions. 9 In the first series of cases which tested the
validity of the statutes, during what is known as the laissez-faire period of our
country's economic history, the courts reached contradictory results as to which
occupations could constitutionally be licensed. 0 By the 1920's however, the
courts had ceased being skeptical of this "friendly legislation" which various
associations requested for their various trades, at least where there was some link,
however remote, to health, safety and welfare. 2' Most courts agreed that there
were outside limits to the type of occupations that could be licensed, but these
limits were not often enforced.2 2 Although there has been general discussion
by commentators and state court judges to the effect that legislatures cannot constitutionally license a profession or occupation by using the sole criteria of protecting the public against dishonest business dealings or exposure to fraud,2" the
15 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). See also Takahashi v. Fish Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410, 416 (1948); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1932); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243,
253 (1906); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). But cf. Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 "(1955).
16 See Fowle v. Common Council, 28 U.S. '(3 Pet.) 398 (1830).
17 Throughout this Note, the reader will encounter the terms "profession," "occupation,"
"vocation," and "trade." The distinction between these words is often unimportant, and some
courts tend to lump them all together for certain purposes such as taxation, see Gennaro v.
United States, 369 F.2d 106, 109 (8th Cir. 1966); for other purposes, however, courts use
the traditional approach and separate the terms according to levels of knowledge and education, see State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961). The
terms are used in this Note as they are commonly understood by people generally, rather than
as they are understood by certain interested groups who tend to think of their work as having
a more professional status than the work of others. For further discussion on this point, see
E . FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 395-96 (1939) and W.
GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 106-09 (1956).
18 See Graves, Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 334 (1939),
and especially the graphs included therein at 340-41. These graphs were updated and strengthened by additional research in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at 23, 78-80.

It may be somewhat surprising to note that most states did not license physicians until as late
as 1890, id. at 23; however, attorneys for the most part were licensed by state courts from early
colonial times, id. at 16.
19 See Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupatioial Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal
and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1965). The author points out the important fact
that "[i]n the critical period of the development of trade restriction through licensing, the
United States Supreme Court did not build up a guiding body of constitutional doctrine." Id.
at 511.
20 Compare the holdings of the cases cited in note 2, supra.
21 Friedman, supra note 19, at 524. See generally Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1938).
22 For cases where these limits were recognized, see Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 62
N.E. 215 '(1901); People v. Beattie, 96 App. Div. 383, 89 N.Y.S. 193 (1904); In re Aubry, 36
Wash. 308, 78 P. 900 (1904). These opinions, although from different sections of the country,
all agreed that the occupation of horseshoeing did not have any proper relation to the police
power of the state. For more recent comparisons, see Buchman v. Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114
P.2d 227 (1941) and State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949) (photography);
Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936) (paper hanging).
23 See, e.g., Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39 S.B.2d 348 (1946), where the court stated:
If the Legislature may for the sole purpose of preventing unfair advertisements,
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typical statute will nevertheless contain some policy statement alluding to a general physical health or safety which will be advanced by the licensing of the
trade.2 4 And despite the fact that many judges continue to at least pay lip service
to the pronouncement that a "state may not under the guise of protecting the
public, arbitrarily interfere with or prohibit private business or lawful occupation,"25 the judicial inclination is to uphold most of these licensing statutes."
The natural outcome is that state legislatures are today "fair game" for lobbyists
who have reason to entertain hopes of success - from practically all pro-

fessions.
Once a statute is passed and the licensing administration established, there
will yet be grounds for objection in occupational licensing. Courts have found,
for instance, that: the apprentice requirements are too restrictive;2" the length
of time required in the occupation before a master's license can be obtained is
too long;2" the license fee is prohibitive; " there are insufficient standards to
control administrative discretion; 0 the regulation violates the state constitution; "
or the scope of the regulation is too broad."2 Still further grounds for objection
arise when the refusal or revocation of a license takes place, in which instance
the question is most often whether the intended licensee is entitled to certain
minimal procedural safeguards. In the past, the answer to this question depended
3
on whether the state courts viewed the license as a right or as a privilege. If
seen as a privilege, it was thought to be given to the holder at the grace of the
state, and could therefore be denied without hearing or notice2 Indeed, the
general due process requirements of notice and hearing as prerequisite to the
denial of an occupational license never have been expounded by state courts.
However, one commentator has observed that several courts have achieved
solicitations, bad workmanship, and unscrupulous dealing, pass laws to limit a given
business to those who are found to be honest and competent, then there would be
no business which would be immune from such prohibitory legislation. Id. at 489,
39 S.E.2d at 351.
For a commentary expressing similar feelings, see Barron, Business and Professional LicensingCalifornia,A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. Rav. 640, 663 '(1966).
24 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 66 (Supp. 1967).
25 Burns Baking Co.v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924). This phrase, or slight variances
of it,usually appear in licensing decisions. See, e.g., Drink, Inc. v. Babcock, 77 N.M. 277,
421 P.2d 798, 802 (1966).
26 See, e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408, 418, 30 N.E.2d 269,
274 (1940); New Jersey Chap., Am.Inst. of Planners v. New Jersey State Bd. of Professional
Planners, 48 N.J. 581, 227 A.2d 313 (1967). For observations in a recent commentary, see
Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in California, 14
STAN. L. REv.533, 537 '(1962).
27 People v. Brown, 407 Ill.
565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950).
28 Tesoriero v. Examination Bd. of Plumbers, 36 Misc. 2d 412, 232 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1962)
(five years of work required).
29 Bloomington v. Ramey, 393 Ill.
467, 66 N.E.2d 385 (1946).
30 See L. JAFFE, supra note 8, at 52-53; Monaghan, The Constitutional and Occupational
Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 B.U.L. Rav. 157, 180 (1961).
31
E.g., Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1966).
32 See Note, Restriction of Freedom of Entry into the Building Trades, 38 IowA L. Rxv.
556, 560 (1953), wherein the writer lists
several cases which held that the statute could not
prohibit "peripheral activities."
33 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953). Two
very good articles on this question of rights and privileges are Barnett, supra note 4, and Note,
The License Problem, 11 Wyo. L. Rav. 106 (1957).
34 See Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 1104, 59 N.W.2d 785, 787-88 (1953).
An excellent commentary speaks to this point, see Note, Administrative Law: Right to Hearing
Before Refusal of an OccupationalLicense, 17 OxrA. L. REv.316 (1964).
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that same result by their interpretation of the licensing statutes.' 5 Furthermore,
the recent Supreme Court case of Willner v. Committee on Characterand Fitness" has seemed to occasion the "extension of the due process clause into the
area of occupational licenses.""7 This high Court authority and the lower court
interpretive trend should remove all lingering doubt that the revocation of an
ordinary occupational license is subject to the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment."8
The establishment of a state board to license a particular occupation or
trade inevitably causes serious difficulties. 9 When that one board is viewed as
part of the thirty or forty licensing boards or agencies in each state,4" the problem
of basic administration assumes massive proportion."1 One of the first thorough
studies on occupations and professions, published in 1939, indicated that a state
could conceivably license nearly one hundred different vocations.4' The typical
licensing board consists of three to seven members who are appointed by the
governor for terms ranging from four to six years,4 and a majority of the members come from the profession being regulated." Normal board duties include
preparing an examination for qualification; issuing, suspending and revoking
licenses; enforcing the licensing statutes (which may mean seeking court injunctions against unlicensed practitioners); approving and supervising occupational
schools; appointing a staff; and making such rules and regulations as are necessary to the fulfillment of its duties.4 Although early commentators warned of
the increasing problems of coordination and centralization of the numerous state
boards, 6 these same problems exist in even greater proportion today due to the
expansion of the number of occupations states wish to license.47 Fortunately,
this is not universally true; due to an increased interest in the field of administrative law during the early 1950's and a sustained momentum since," several states
have managed to reorganize some of their licensing boards,"9 and others have reworked general state administrative procedures.5 0
35
36
37
38

See Note, supra note 34, at 316-17 n.5.
373 U.S. 96 (1963).
Note, supra note 34, at 317.
See Gilchrist v. Bierring, 234 Iowa 899, 14 N.W.2d 724 (1944). See also W. GELLHORN
AND C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 451-822 (4th ed. 1960); Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 741 (1964).
39 For a comprehensive two volume treatise on the difficulties which states face in the
area of general administrative law, see F. COOPER, STATE ADSIUNISTRATIVE LAW (1965).
40 See the numerous licensing boards listed in CouNciL oF STATE GOVERNENTS, supra
note 4, at 81-83.
41 Id. at 30.
42 Graves, supra note 18, at 338-39.
43 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 66 (Supp. 1967).
44 CousNcIL OF STATE GOVERNME-NTS, supra note 4, at 84-90.
45 Id. at 41-47.
46 Graves, supra note 18, at 336.
47 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-330 to -395 (Supp. 1968), where the Connecticut Legislature has recently licensed ten new occupations.
48 Two examples of this interest are the efforts of the Council of State Governments in
continually suggesting new legislation in the occupational fields and development by the
American Bar Association of its Administrative Law Review. The Review began in 1949
as a 12 page publication under the name of the Administrative Law Bulletin, and has expanded
to a 100 page seasonal publication.
49 See, e.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(113a) (Supp. 1968). For a detailed analysis of
this state's attempt to revise its licensing boards, see Eley, Michigan's Professional and Occupational Licensing Boards: Organization and Powers, 41 U. DET. L.J. 347 (1964).
50 The Model State Administrative Act represents one recent development in administra-
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Over the years, various articles and judicial opinions on the nature of state
occupational licensing have pointed out certain inherent defects in the licensing
systems. The following enumeration51 is not intended to be exhaustive, but it
does contain the most frequent criticisms of state licensing.
(1) The licensing laws are urged by associations who wish to be
regulated, and the proposed act actually gives
members from that associa52
tion majority status on the licensing board.
(2) The examinations and qualifications tend to become stricter and
more demanding over the years, while the original act granted without
question - through what are known as "Grandfather Clauses" - licenses
to all persons who were then engaged in the profession.5 3
(3) There are unnecessary restrictions placed on those who wish to
enter a profession or occupation. These restrictions occur in the form of
an excessive number of years apprenticeship or journeymanship or some
similar provision that requires54an applicant to be endorsed by one or more
masters before he can license.
(4) The effects of licensing tend to evolve from first giving the group
a social status, then to allowing it to control entry into the occupation, until
finally it controls competition within the occupation. 55
(5) Because of (4), licensing is a 56means for continuing any implied
discrimination policies of an association.
(6) The examination, established for the purpose of providing for
the community's health, welfare and safety, tests only the individual's ability
to pass an examination. There is no supervision of his performance once
he is licensed. 57
(7) Board members are more interested in their own professions than
in the general welfare of society; the latter should be their main concern
since they exist as an arm of the state."
(8) A complicated licensing system by its very nature discourages
many who wish to enter a licensed occupation as their life's vocation.5 9
III. City Licensing -

Reflections of the State

The notion that "cities are creatures of the state" is a principle familiar to
our state-oriented governments. Writing on the general extent of municipal
powers, Judge Dillon formulated in 1911 what has since become known as
Dillon's Rule:
tion. For an examination of the Act as recently adopted by Georgia, see Sierk, Administrative
Law, 18 MERCER L. REv. 1 (1966).
51 These eight objections appear in many of the articles on the topic of state licensing
law, and may also be applicable to city licensing. Their validity or invalidity does not seem
to be as important as the necessity of being mindful of them when reorganizing existing
statutes. The list excludes several controversies that can be termed exclusively "state issues",
e.g., possible restriction on the governor's power to appoint the licensing board members so
as to eliminate all traces of political favoritism in the process of obtaining a license.
52

See generally Opperman, supra note 6.

53 See generally McClellan v. Kansas City, 379 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1964).
54 See generally People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950).
55 See generally Monaghan, supra note 30, at 175 n.104.
56 See generally Note, License Revocation-A Means of Enforcing State and Municipal
Antidiscrimznation Agency Orders, 52 IA. L. REv.78 (1966).
57 See generally Opperman, supra note 6.
58 See Barron, supra note 23, at 653-54.
59 See generally W. GELLHORN, supra note 17, at 105-51.
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It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential
to the accomplishment of the declared objects and 6purposes
of the corpo0
ration, - not simply convenient, but indispensable.
This rule, or some rephrased variation of it produced by the different state
courts,6' is still the test used to determine the proper exercise of licensing powers
by a city. 2 Although Dillon wrote his Commentaries at a time when state courts
were following a strict construction policy of the express statutory grants,63 state
courts have today reached the point where they will uphold, in at least a few
fields, city licensing laws under an implied grant of power from the state. 4 In
so doing, the courts at times have found the power implied in a grant to the city
to regulate another activity,6" while at other times they have found it implied
as a logical consequence from a series of other grants under a "gap-filling"
notion.G
In the building trades, however, the courts have not wished to look beyond
either an expressed authorization in a city's charter or an expressed grant by
state statute giving the city the power to license an occupation. Thus, in State
ex rel Sheldon v. City of Wheeling,"5 the West Virginia Supreme Court struck
down a fifteen-year old city ordinance which required that plumbers be licensed,
relying on the policy that "[w]here a fair, substantial, reasonable doubt exists
as to whether such corporation is possessed of a power, the power must be denied. ' 69 And in Ives v. City of Chicago," which concerned an attempt by the
city to license a building contractor, the court, failing to find any express legislative grant, addressed itself to the question of whether an implied grant of power
could "be gathered as necessary and incidental to powers expressly granted.""'
The city used a "gap-filling" argument, enumerating the other building trades
that the city was expressly authorized to license, and argued that regulation of
building contractors could be fairly implied. Unpersuaded, the court responded:
60 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237, at
448-49 '(5th ed. 1911).
61 E.g., Sheldon v. City of Wheeling, 122 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1961).
62 See Kneier, supra note 7. The fust part of this article examines the power of cities to
license under the following headings: (1) Express Grant of the Power to License, (2)
Express Grant of the Power to Regulate, and (3) General Grant of the Police Power. These
headings express the modem interpretation of Dillon's Rule.
63 See Bear v. City of Cedar Rapids, 147 Iowa 341, 126 N.W. 324 (1910); State ex rel.
Sampson v. City of Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 359, 170 P. 1, 4 '(1918).
64 See McClellan v. Kansas City, 379 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1964).
65 E.g., Father Basil's Lodge, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 393 Ill. 246, 65 N.E.2d 805 (1946).
66 E.g., City of Chicago v. Arbuckle Bros., 343 Ill. 597, 176 N.E. 761 (1931).
67 It should be pointed out that in dealing with fifty-one jurisdictions, it would be folly
to speak of a universal principle that prescribes how a city draws its source of power from
the state in order to license occupations. The "expressed grant" theory that is mentioned in
this article is most applicable to those states in which the legislature has chosen to enumerate
the occupations that a city may license. In such instances, the courts usually find the list
exhaustive. See notes 68-72 infra and accompanying text.
68 122 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1961).
69 Id. at 428.
70 30 Ill. 2d 582, 198 N.E.2d 518 (1964).
71 Id. at 583, 198 N.E.2d at 519.
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The city then argues that from the foregoing powers expressly granted,
it has the implied power to enact the ordinances here involved. It would
seem that the existence of the enumerated statutory powers has just the
opposite effect and precludes the imposition of regulations and licenses
upon contractors in fields other than those to which cities have been expressly
given regulatory power"
Reflection on this failure to have the express legislative grants to license has
prompted the suggestion that the enactment of a municipal "home rule" law
could remedy the difficulties arising therefrom. 3 While this may be true if
properly handled, a legislative grant of "home rule" in practical terms means
an almost unlimited power to license, to regulate under the police power, and
to tax - which in many cities would likely cause more harm than good making each city a powerful small state. 4 In this regard, it is interesting to note
that in Sheldon the City of Wheeling was thought to be exercising West Virginia's
5
grant of home rule powers at the time its plumbing ordinance was struck down.
"Home rule" is a nice sounding term, but it often creates more conflicts between
city and state governments in the licensing area than it solves."' Before "home
rule" is adopted in the broad scope that some wish, it is necessary to consider
the desirability of each and every city having the confusion in occupational
licensing that presently exists in many state licensing agencies, or the unlimited
power to tax all local businesses.
The question of whether a city has, by implication, the power to license
certain occupations, and whether the state, by entering a field, withdraws from
7
the local governments expressed grants of power to license are far from settled.
Doubtless there will be more cities who, like Wheeling and Chicago, will awaken
one day to find that one of several of the building trades that they have been
licensing for years are not proper subjects of their police power.' With regard
to this presumption by the cities of their authority to license, Professor Jaffe,
while surveying the different standards in licensing ordinances and statutes,
similarly remarked that "[t]hese statues long antedate the modem demand for
72

Id. at 585, 198 N.E. 2d at 520.

74
75

Id.
Comment, Municipal Corporations-Powerto License Plumbers Denied, 64 W. VA. L.

76

See, e.g., Comment, Business Licensing: The City-State Conflict in California, 49

73 J.

SIEGEL, CHICAGO'S POWER TO LicENCE AND REGULATE

25-30 '(1965).

REv. 444 (1962). This comment points out that Wheeling had been licensing its plumbers
under a broad grant of power which it had been given by the state legislature in 1935, but that
nowhere therein had the specific power to license plumbers been expressed or even implied.
The author of that comment believes that under a properly drawn "home rule" statute, the
city could have exercised its licensing power in this circumstance.
L. REv. 331 (1961). The licensing conflict described therein takes the form of state
pre-emption.
CALIF.

77 Id. The current conflict in California between the cities and the state arises on two

levels: first, cities are only allowed to license for revenue purposes, while the state has power
to license under the police power; second, whenever there is a jurisdictional conflict between
the two, the state prevails, and this, in turn, eliminates a very lucrative source of city revenue.
78 The reason for this seems to be that many cities in the past few years have attempted
to license more and more occupations, simply without realizing that they may not have the
authority to do so. For further examples similar to Sheldon and Ives, see Minnetonka Electric
Co. v. Village of Golden Valley, 273 Minn. 301, 141 N.W.2d 138 (1966) '(electrical con-

tracting pre-empted by the state); Raby v. Westphall Homes Inc., 76 N.M. 252, 414 P.2d 227
(1966) (carpeting contractor); Borough of Belmar v. Berube, 63 N.J. Super. 69, 163 A:2d
739 (1960) (plumber services); Mason City v. Zerble, 250 Iowa 102, 93 N.W.2d 94 (1958)

(electrical contractor) ; Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957) *(tile contractor).
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stated limits on official power. Characteristically they contain no standard; their
validity was taken for granted. 79
Once the question of the authority of a city to license a trade is satisfied,
an inquiry must be made into the normal operation of the city's licensing administration and procedure. Initially, there is no question that the due process
requirements which were discussed above as limiting the state's power to license'0
are also applicable to the cities. In many states there further exists the problem
that one or more of the building trades or service occupations are historically
licensed on the state level, 8 while the city has been given the expressed power
to license the other occupations. This selection of state-licensed trades is obviously
not based on reasons of danger or extensive skill, for many times the occupations
left to direct city licensing are far more hazardous and technical.8 2 Conversely
there is no clear rationale for the seemingly haphazard selection of one building
trade over another for city licensing. The very existence of such a split level of
authority would seem to result in a weaker administrative control by city building
departments over building codes and the activities of contractors. Indeed, the
holders of state licenses might well be less responsive to the city's demands or
regulations than those contractors whose licenses depend on their active cooperation with the city.
There are some defects in city administration that are common to all building trade occupations. Typical state statutes, for example, which grant in express terms the subject matter of the city's licensing power, fail completely in
giving the city any direction as to how to administer the licensing of these occupations. Consider the Ohio statute which gives the cities power to license plumbers,
electricians, sewer trappers and vault cleaners - a scope difficult to guess from
the title:
§ 715.27. Erection of fences and signs; construction and repair of
equipment; licensing.
Any municipal corporation may:
(C) Provide for the licensing of house movers, electrical contractors,
plumbers, sewer tappers, and vault cleaners.83
Nowhere in Ohio's code is there even a suggestion as to how this licensing is
to be implemented. By silently leaving this task to the ingenuity of the various
cities throughout the -state, the Ohio statute fairly cries out the reason for the
disorder in the area of city licensing. The confusion is increased by the dearth
of research material available.
Although there are a few specific studies on the actual licensing administration of several of our country's larger cities, 4 there appear to be no comparative
For a like result in a non-building trade, see Abdoo v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo.
127, 397 P.2d 222 (1964) (photographers).

79

L.

80

See notes 21-34 supra and accompanying text.

81

JAFFE,

supra note 8, at 52.

See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at 79-80.
82 In the Lawyer survey, twenty-six out of twenty-nine cities throughout the country
indicated that they license the occupation of electrician or electrical contractor
83 OHIO REV. CoDa ANN. § 715.27 (Page 1954).
84 E.g., M. P~ASONs, The Use of the Licensing Power by the City of Chicago (1952);
J. SIEGEL, supra note 73.
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studies or compilations of the different systems of licensing administration that
are employed by various cities in the various states. To fill this gap, a survey of
selected cities throughout the United States was conducted by the Lawyer to
determine the extent and use of their licensing power over building trades."'
Of the thirty cities responding, covering twenty-six states, the most frequently
licensed occupations are electricians, plumbers, furnacemen or warm air heating
contractors, and general contractors." The licensing administration follows a
common pattern of being created by city ordinance and administered through
either the Inspection Department or the City Clerk's Office. 7 The ordinance
usually allows the examination provided by those offices to be given upon request.88
A great majority of the cities have one or more occupational licensing
boards, 9 which have the important function of drawing up the examination and
passing on the fitness of applicants.9" Membership on the licensing boards is
usually by appointment of the mayor or city manager, 1 though other methods
are also used.0 The composition of these boards differs between cities, both in
the number of members and in their occupational representation, and stems from
two different approaches to the licensing board system." Some cities employ a
board for each occupation, 4 while other cities maintain only one board with all
85 The Lawyer is grateful to the large majority of cities who took the trouble to respond,
and to do so in such a cooperative spirit. The number of replies, the completeness of the
answers and the many copies of city ordinances which were received all indicate to this
author the great interest that exists among the cities of this country in the proper use of city
licensing.
The full results of this survey and copies of the questionnaire used will be kept on file
in the Lawyer office at The Notre Dame Law School. For a list of those cities participating and
their populations, see Appendix A infra.
86 For a breakdown of these occupations, see Appendix A infra. The other occupations
mentioned in our survey cover such diverse fields as refrigeration and air conditioning, stationary engineer, painting contractor, sign servicemen, and television repairmen. The latter
occupation was licensed by only three southern cities-Decatur, Alabama, Macon, Georgia
and Asheville, North Carolina-and through their taxing power, not under any claim of
licensing for regulatory purposes.
87 Those cities which license through the taxing power given to them by the states handle
the licensing through a city tax or revenue department.
88 See Appendix A infra.
89 Although most cities who use these boards referred to them as "licensing boards," at
least one city, Canton, Ohio, insisted on terming them "examination boards." Possibly this
means that the board is not authorized or delegated the power to license, although in practical
effect it seems clear that those who control the examination also control the license.
90 This is not always the case, however; for example, Idaho Falls, Idaho, responded that
its applicants for occupational licenses must be approved by the mayor and city council. Two
other cities, Orlando, Florida, and Binghamton, New York, mentioned that they solicit help
from a nearby college to prepare some of the examinations. The City of Orlando filed a very
comprehensive response, and in answer to a query on the existence of a licensing board and its
functions stated:
Each category above has its own examining board composed of members of the industry, appointed by the Mayor and approved by City Council to serve on the boards
for one year. (Each board) recommends to Council the type of examination to be
given, grades applicant's papers, and also serves as an advisory board to keep the
codes relating to their industry updated.
91 The advantages to be derived from appointment of the board by the city manager seem
political at best. Cities using this mode of appointment are Springfield, Missouri, Hamilton,
Ohio, and Beaumont, Texas.
92 E.g., Burlington, Vermont, has a License Committee elected by the voters of the city.
93 See Appendix A infra.
94 Id.
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different occupations and interested parties represented." Cities falling within
the latter category provide for a rather diverse cross-section of members of the
professions involved."
The licensing of the different occupations is almost always broken down
into the three historic categories of Master, Journeyman and Apprentice. There
are few cities that impose any type of educational or residency requirement.
The minimum age requirement ranges from 16 to 21 years,9 and the cities are
almost uniform in requiring a term of years actual experience before a building
tradesman is able to advance to the next license level." In addition to demanding
these personal qualifications, a few cities further require some evidence of financial responsibility before they will issue a license.10 0
With respect to the division of occupational work, the survey probed into
the area of cross-licensing, and inquired whether one occupation could do incidental work on larger projects that would seem properly to belong to a different
occupation.'
A large majority of the cities reported a recognition of strict division of the trade functions,' while a few others indicated that they would allow
overlapping of functions in special areas."' 3
95 In the cities which use the multi-board system, its composition ranges from the simplicity of the electrical board of Casper, Wyoming, composed of an electrical contractor, a
graduate engineer, and the city electrical inspector, to the gas-fitters' board of Springfield,
Missouri, composed of three gas-fitters, three master plumbers, one journeyman plumber, a
member of the Missouri Inspection Bureau, and a member selected by the city manager.
96 A good example of this type of board is the "Board of Examiners for Craft Licenses"
established by the City of Hamilton, Ohio. Its ordinance provides as follows:
One member shall be the Building Commissioner, one member shall be the Supervisor of Construction Inspection, one member a sanitary engineer or a master plumbing contractor, one member a heating engineer or master heating contractor, one
member an electrical engineer or master electric contractor, one member an architect,
one member a structural engineer or general contractor, one member a representative
of Labor, and one member a citizen. . . . HAMILTON, OHio, BUILDING COD, ch. 1
§ 120.1 (1963).
97 See Appendix A infra. Only two cities, Binghamton, New York, and Casper, Wyoming,
stated a requirement that the person have at least a high school education. Two other cities,
Terre Haute, Indiana, and Springfield, Ohio, mentioned that they have available or operate
a school of plumbing management. Undoubtedly most cities, through their public high school
programs, offer some type of electrical or mechanical shop training.
98 See Appendix A infra.
99 Sixteen cities require that a person must work under a master as an apprentice for a
designated period of time, which may run from two years, as in Decatur, Alabama, to the more
standard term of five years, as in Binghamton, New York. Fourteen cities impose a number of
working years' experience upon a journeyman before he can be eligible to take the master's
examination. For a further breakdown of these time requirements, see Appendix A infra.
100 The City of Pueblo, Colorado, is an appropriate example.
101 The precise question presented was:
16. Are there any ordinances or regulations which would allow a plumber to wire his
installation, e.g., to wire an electrical hot water heater; or for a furnaceman to
make his own plumbing connection or wiring?
102 See Appendix A infra. In describing the only way it felt that this stated task could be
performed, Idaho Falls, Idaho, said, "He must be a qualified licensed person in each requirement to do the work, i.e. the plumber would carry both a plumber's card and electrician's card
if he wired the hot water heater, etc."
103 Covington, Kentucky, indicated that although plumbers are licensed by the state, they
can still do minimal electrical work as long as it passes the electrical inspection. Salina, Kansas,
made a distinction between new work and old work, and would allow a furnaceman to reconnect old lines. Three cities Mesa, Arizona, Kalamazoo, Michigan, and Green Bay, Wisconsin - seemed to indicate that this could be done under a limited electrical license. Ohio
cities seemed to be divided on the point. Both Springfield and Canton said that this could not
be done, but Dayton and Hamilton would permit it. The only other conflicting position is that
taken by Saginaw, Michigan, which requires all furnaces to be wired by electricians, although
it conversely allows the furnaceman to do his own plumbing.
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Pinpointing one of the more troublesome problems in the licensing area,
the cities were questioned as to the territorial extent of the licenses they issued.
Very few cities indicated that the licenses they granted are honored by any of
the surrounding cities, 04 while others indicated that they would recognize another
city's license if they were so approached. °5
Except where the state licenses the occupation, the cities surveyed were
unanimous in indicating their power to set license fees. There are great variances
between the amounts set per year for the different experience levels in any one
profession as well as between the amounts for different professions." 0 Considering
the average fee as an appropriate guideline, a master would be charged twentyfive dollars yearly for a license, a journeyman, ten dollars, and, at the lowest level,
an apprentice would pay five dollars per year. The average examination fee is
about fifteen dollars.
All the cities surveyed use a "permit system" to enforce their building codes
and license ordinances. A typical "permit system" requires that no work except
that of an emergency nature can be started on a job without preliminary registration with the building department and the obtaining of a "permit," with the
time limit imposed, to do the work.'
Often included in the permit fee is the
price of an inspection. If the work does not pass the first inspection, the fee is
again charged for a second inspection, and so on.
Most of the cities have established elaborate sanctions for violations of their
building codes. In this regard, they can be divided into two distinct groups for
analytical purposes. The slight majority give notice that correction must be made
within a stated number of days; failure to comply with such notice will allow
the city to bring court action against the contractor for violation of a city ordinance. 0 8 The remaining cities double the permit fee for failure to obtain a permit or impose a fine for violation of a code regulation; in some instances, they
summon the offender to appear before the licensing board for revocation of his
09

license.1

104 See Appendix A infra. It should be noted here that several cities have at least one
occupation licensed at the state level, in which case the license by its very nature is good in any
city in the state.
105 See Appendix A infra.
106 The highest fee revealed by the Survey is three hundred and twenty-five dollars a year
for a commercial contractor's license in Macon, Georgia. There, however, the city licenses
through its taxing power. At the other extreme is Green Bay, Wisconsin, which charges only
one dollar for an electrical license.
107 See, e.g., SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI, PLUMBING CODE ch. 28, art. 11, § 28-11 to -15 (1963).
108 See Appendix A infra. A typical response from this first group of cities is that of Lake
Charles, Louisiana:
A violation notice would be issued to this person and he would be required to conform with the code within a specified amount of time. If he failed to comply, the
matter would be turned over to the City Prosecuting Attorney.
109 The theory behind this approach to code violations consisting of work done without a
permit seems to be that the infraction directly relates to the person as a license holder and as
a violator of an ordinance. The underlying principle is apparently that the threat of ending a
man's livelihood is considerably more effective than the imposition of a court fine for his violation of the ordinance in question.
It is noteworthy that there seems to be a fair amount of arbitrariness in handing out
double fees. Compare the response of Casper, Wyoming, that "We can invoke a double fee,
which is done regularly," with that of Covington, Kentucky: "If jobs are started without a
permit, permit fee can be doubled. This does not apply to Plumbers, but to all other contractors. Plumbers are under a different ordinance than general contractors."
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From the information gathered, it appears that the overall city licensing
system has quite a few similarities with the systems used by the states to license
occupations. Selection and membership of the licensing boards, along with the
tendency toward multiple status of such boards, are common grounds. A system
of examinations is used on both levels. What is more important is that most
courts are inclined to treat the two governmental levels of licensing in identical
fashion for purposes of procedural due process.11 Unfortunately, the comparison
does not end here. The eight previously noted objections to the state licensing
system... are applicable with even greater force at the city level, both because
of the greater number of city boards in existence, and because of the greater
possibility that local officials will fail to maintain a relatively high degree of legal
sensitivity to overall fairness while dealing with such fundamental and practical
matters. Furthermore, an alleged violator at the low level of municipal administration and regulation is more likely to forego full judicial review of the declared violation, choosing rather to subject himself to the relatively small fines
involved than to the uncertainties and expense of litigation. 2
IV. City Licensing -

An Evaluation

Recognizing that the problems which have been shown to exist at the state
level are even more intense at the municipal level, values must be weighed to
determine whether the city licensing system justifies its existence. The strongest
reason for the retention of licensing at the lowest level seems to be found in the
principle of subsidiarity - that the closest and most economical control of building codes and standards exists at the city level. The city also seems to be the
most logical level for effective regulation of the various occupational members;
it can best insure that they are performing proper work after they have been
examined and licensed."'
It must be remembered, however, that the unfavorable points of city licensing are very substantial. The main defects center around the licensing ordinance and the licensing board. At this late date, it cannot be denied that city
licensing laws embody enormous benefits for the occupations that are to be regulated, and that they often permit licensees to rise to the brink of monopoly.
More than a decade ago, the author of one of the most complete studies on a
city's power to license had observed that
Here, (at the city level), viewed realistically, the situation is one in
which organized and politically influential occupational groups have sought
110 See generally Note, supra note 56, at 81-84.
111 See notes 52-59 supra and accompanying text.
112 W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 26-27 (1966). The author mentions that
this municipal canalization of choice has been referred to as a "kind of administrative blackmail." Id. at 27, quoting from Nelson, Administrative Blackmail: The Remission of Penalties,
4 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 610, 620 (1951).
113 Speaking on the general topic of licensing and control in answer to our survey, E.
Stansberry, Superintendent of Building Inspection for the City of Dayton, Ohio, clearly indicated the gaps that can exist in effective state regulating. Ohio expressly empowers the cities
to regulate only electrical contractors and plumbers. See OHIso Rv. CODE ANN., § 715.27
(Page 1954). Mr. Stansberry evidenced the plight of the city when he stated, "General contractor licensing would also be helpful, but apparently we are not ready for this at the
present." Knowingly or not, the "we" he referred to was the Ohio General Assembly.
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more blatantly to use public licensing authority for the- furtherance of
their own limited occupational ambitions, although under the guise of,
and perhaps actually serving, some public purpose." 4

Approaching the development of licensing from a purely economic level, a more
recent detailed survey at the Carnegie Institute of Technology concluded that
"many (licensing regulations) are not strictly in the public interest and seem to

be intended to restrict competition."''

5

There is reason, therefore, to view the

city licensing system with suspicion, and the most logical target for scrutiny is

the licensing board."' It is crucially unimportant that an existing ordinance
may originally have had its bottom in bad philosophy; the board must ultimately
be responsible for the perpetuation of that philosophy.
Other factors which militate against city licensing deserve mention: (a)
the cities tend to exceed their authority to license given them either by statute
or by charter;" 7 (b) the lack of reciprocity as regards honoring other cities'
trade licenses necessitates re-licensing and re-examination for any contractors who

work in a metropolitan area but wish to serve a county-wide public;"' (c) it
increases the danger that "young people who lack influential friends or who may
choose to enter a given occupation at a time when those -within the occupation
believe the field is crowded may find it impossible to overcome the obstacles put
in their way"; ' (d) the cities have too much control over the termination of a
man's livelihood.'
V. Is State Licensing the Answer?
The best approach to prepare a replacement system for the present haphazard licensing structure that exists in most states is to retain the advantages
of local control while eliminating its abuses. Putting this conversely, the optimum
system will result from selecting the benefits that are offered by central control
while retaining local supervision.
The operation of the city licensing boards should be one of the first subjects
considered for removal to the state level.' 2' The advantages, such as centralized
control, that would result from such removal would be even greater if the present
state board structures were reorganized as to their composition - specifically
114

M. PARSONS, supra note 84, at 146.
115 Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 93, 117 (1961).
116 In some candid advice to our survey, Mr. Robert Lange, the Building Inspector of the
City of Salina, Kansas, stated:
I am very much in favor of having the examinations administered on the state
level. Frequently the "law of supply and demand" seems to influence the percentage
of applicants that pass the exam! There is considerable pressure placed on examining
boards because of personal acquaintances, etc.
117 See State ex rel. Sheldon v. City of Wheeling, 122 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1961).
118 See notes 104-05 supra and accompanying text.
119 Opperman, supra note 6, at 810.
120 See note 109 supra. A further criticism is that the "permit system" is always open to
abuse, since one city inspector could, for reasons of bias, refuse to issue a permit. The foundation for this criticism is the argument that the lower the level at which a permit may be
administratively denied, the weaker the traditional notions of due process become. Portland,
Maine, recognized this defect in answering a question concerning action taken for a violation:
"He could not get any permit here in the city until he had a license and corrected his violations to the satisfaction of the Inspector."
121 See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
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if state boards were staffed by disinterested experts whose duties would be more
Furthermore, since the practical effect of reministerial than discretionary."
quiring a fixed period of experience as a prerequisite to advancement to higher
occupational license levels is to discourage ambitious young men looking for a
profession, procedures should be established to test minimal knowledge necessary
to perform the occupation safely and professionally. Such tests should then be
substituted as criteria for licensing the various levels, so that advancement in
licensing would be a function of skill and ability rather than the mere passage
This, logically, would open up the personal service market; by alof time.'
lowing a person to receive his license before getting a job, it would put an end
to the guild system of labor that now exists. Importantly, licensing at the state
level would also provide for uniform application standards as far as education,
training, and age are concerned.
One of the greatest advantages of state licensing for the contractor or
license holder is that it would permit him to practice in any city throughout the
Such statewide-honored
state without having to obtain numerous licenses.'
licensing would result in a mobile work force that would be as flexible as required by the demands of area construction. Although many contractors might
seem at first to be satisfied with licensing uniformity at the county level, the
objection to so limited a system of licensing becomes obvious to them when they
attempt to work throughout a megalopolitan area that crosses many county
lines. 5 In this regard, state-level licensing would surely offer streamlined procedures, and would be more responsive to correction.
We have suggested a system of state-level licensing which would incorporate
minimum standard testing as a substitute for the rigid requirement of having to
work under a master in the specific trade involved. In order to round out this
suggestion, it is, of course necessary to clearly delineate the power to be left to
the city. At the very least, the justification of a state minimum standards system
of testing applicants depends upon the stringent enforcement of city codes and
the utilization by the cities of the highest standards for inspections."' Under
our suggested system, the city would continue to supervise the performance
122 One suggestion as to how this could be done would be to staff the board with college
professors. As experts in the various fields, they would be invaluable in preparing examinations.
123 The objection to this suggestion is that in the building trade occupations, experience is
more important than the ability to pass an exam. The answer is that, at least on the lowest
level of the profession, there is no absolute necessity for the existing time sequence that
requires several years' work experience before an apprentice license or a journeyman's license
is finally given on the strength of the master's request.

124 The reciprocity problems that presently exist have not gone without recognition on the
municipal level, as evidenced by the rather concerned response given to our survey by the
Building Commissioner of Hamilton, Ohio, Mr. Lloyd Towers:
About five (5) years ago, we made a rather informal survey of about 40 other
cities in Ohio who then had populations over about 20,000 people in order to
determine whether we could establish reciprocity with them. We found primarily
that the City of Hamilton seemed to license more extensively than almost all the
other cities which we contacted. State licensing would certainly make it easier for
contractors and licensed persons to do work in all areas without the necessity of reapplication, re-examination and other requirements which must be met in each
locality.
125 See generally W. VON EcARDT, THE COALLENGE OF MEGALOPOLIS (1964).
126 Regarding inspections, most city ordinances require reinspection if work is not found
satisfactory the first time. See, e.g., BURLINGTON, VERMONT, REv. ORDINANCES tit. 5, ch. 3,

§ 827 (1962).
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standards of licensees operating in the city, but it would not have the power "to
pull" a violator's license. Instead it could send a notice of infraction to the state
office for further investigation. This illustrates our expressed intention of having
the licensing at the state level with administration at the local level.'7 A further
illustration can be demonstrated by the licensing procedure. A person who
wished to be licensed would register at the city building, and the city would
approve his application in accordance with the standards laid down by statute.
The city would then send the application to the state licensing bureau, which
would in turn forward an exam to be administered by the city and returned to
the bureau for grading. If the person met the established minimal standards,
he would be issued the license by the state. Those cities which are authorized
to collect an occupational tax from residents could then require a resident licensee
to register his license with the city.
VI. Conclusion
The body of law concerning city licensing is neither very glamorous nor
very settled. Even a cursory examination of existing city ordinances reveals the
essentially vital flaw of pervading confusion. The dangers arising therefrom
are compounded by the tendency which most cities have to resolve all doubts
concerning power to license in favor of themselves. It cannot seriously be
doubted that this notion of city sovereignty has caused hardships, financial and
otherwise, to many persons honestly wishing to enter a building trade profession.
Nor can it be doubted nor should it be ignored that city licensing boards
are open to the abuses of petty bias, wrongful economic control, direct political
influence, and graft. Conflicts of interest seem to characterize their composition
as a rule rather than as an exception. Although this can. all too easily be forgotten in the face of the seemingly persuasive argument that experienced contractors are the most qualified judges of applicants for occupational licenses that these contractors also come from private companies which bid and compete
heavily in relatively small cities or county-wide areas - a moment of practical
reflection will surely suggest that a desire to curb such competition could well
control their licensing actions. City licensing becomes even more offensive when
seen as the tool that it is for the perpetuation of the guild system, and for the
oppression of those who wish to enter building trade occupations but haven't
the influence necessary to do so.
Simply remedying the entrance problems will not cure all the ills of the
existing system, for licensed contractors themselves are plagued by the threat
of too much control over their only means of livelihood, and by the obvious
inconvenience of having to take out a license for each city in which they wish
to practice. State licensing is the meaningful solution to all of these problems.
If the state legislatures do not act, the future will be riddled with increased
litigation; the system of direct city licensing of building trades should not be
permitted to continue.
William C. Keck
127

See p. 21 supra.
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APPENDIX A

Responses of Cities Surveyed
Times When
Exams May
Be Taken
R
R
NI
R

Occupations
Cities
(Population) 1
Licensed
Decatur, Ala.
(29,217) P, E, TV, GC
Mesa, Ariz.
(50,529) P, E, F
Bakersfield, Q aU. (56,848) All by state
Pueblo, Colo.
(91,181) P, E, F, GC, 0
Orlando, Fla.

(88,135)

P, E

NI

Macon, Ga.
(122,876)
Mason City, Ia.
(30,642)
Idaho Falls, Idaho (33,161)
Terre Haute, Ind. (72,500)

P, B, F,'TV, GC
E
P, E, F
P, E, GOC

Salina, Kan.
Covington, Ky.
Lake Charles, La.
Portland, Me.
Kalamazoo, Mich.
Saginaw, Mich.
Springfield, Mo.
Binghamton, N.Y.

E, 0
March, Sept.
E, F, TV, GC, C
NI
P, E
R
NI
NI
E, F, 0
R
Every 6 Months
B, F
P, E
Mo
P, E
Scheduled

(43,202)
(60,376)
(63,392)
'(72,566)
(82,089)
(98,265)
(95,865)
(75,941)

Asheville, N.C.
(60,192)
Canton, Ohio
(113,631)
Dayton, Ohio
(262,332)
Hamilton, Ohio
(72,354)
Springfield, Ohio
(82,723)

F,
P,
P,
P,
P,

Eugene, Ore.

(50,977)

P, E, F, 0

(61,055)
(111,827)
(119,175)
(97,110)
(35,531)
(62,888)
(38,930)

P
P, E
E, GC
P, E, F, GC
P, E, F
E, GC
P, E

Lancaster, Pa.
Knoxville, Tenn.
Beaumont, Tex.
Roanoke, Va.
Burlington, Vt.
Green Bay, Wis.
Casper, Wyo.

Symbols

TV
E, F, 0
E, F
B, F, 0
E, F, GC

P-plumbing
E-electrical
F-furnace
TV-television
repair
GO-general contractor
0-others
NI-none indicated

R,Q
R, 2 per yr.
30 days
R

System of
Licensing Education, Age, or
Boards Other Requirements
NI
None
S
None
NI
NI
MB
Financial
Responsibility
MB
Master Electrician-21 yrs.
S
None
S
NI
NI
State qualifications
MB
School of Plumbing

MB
None
None 18 yrs. age minimum
MB
None
NI
None
None
None
MB
None
MB Must reside near city
MB
High School
Graduate
NI
S for E
NI
Q
MB
None
Q
MB 18 yrs. age minimum
Mo
S
Yes
T wice per month
MB
Plumbing Vocational School
90 day max.
MB
Schooling for
Masonry
Contractor
R
S for P
NI
R, Mo
S for E
None
R
S for E
NI
R
S
None
Mo
S
None
R
S
Yes
R
MB
High School Grad.,
16 yr. age min.

R-upon request
Q-quarterly
Mo-monthly
NI-none indicated

S-single NI-none indicated
board
MB-multiple
boards
P-plumbing
E-electrical
NI-none
indicated
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NOTES

Maximum Time (yrs.)
Requirement in Any
Trade Licensed
A-2
None
NI
None
A-P-5; J-P-4

Allows Cross
Functions of

Trades
No
Yes
NI
No
No

City's License
Honored in
Surrounding
Area
No
Yes
NI
No
Yes

None

No

No

A-4; J-1
A-E-2; A-4
A-5
None

No
No
No
Yes
(repair only)
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

NI
None
A-E-2
Yes-NI
A-4; J-2
A-E-4; J-E-4
A-5; J-5
NI
A-5
A-P-4; J-P-3
Depends upon trade
A-P-5

No
No
Yes

None

Yes
(repair only)

NI
None
A-4

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No

J-3
A-E-4; A-P-10,000 hrs.
A-E-4; J-5
A-4; J-4

A-apprentice
J-journeyman
M-master
P-plumbing
B-electrical
NI-none indicated

Manner of
City Would
Honor Other Dealing with
Cities' Licenses
Violators
No
CA
Yes
NI
NI
NI
No
DF
Yes
BB
No

CA

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Statewide Plumbing Statewide Plumbing
Statewide Plumbing Statewide Plumbing
No
No
Statewide Plumbing Statewide Plumbing
Statewide Electrical Statewide Electrical
Yes
Yes
Yes
Plumbers
No
Yes

Yes

No

NI-none indicated

Statewide Plumbing Statewide Plumbing
No
No
Yes
NI
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

NI-none indicated

NI-none indicated

CA-court
action
DF-double
fee of
permit
BB-taken
before
licensing
board

1All population figures are taken from the 1960 census as recorded in 1967 WoLD
ALMANAC

333-62 (L. Long ed.).

